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ARTICLE
THE DUTY TO PRESERVE ESI
(ITS TRIGGER, SCOPE, AND LIMIT)
& THE SPOLIATION DOCTRINE
IN MARYLAND STATE COURTS
By: Michael D. Berman1
INTRODUCTION
nder the ancient doctrine omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatem, “[a]ll
things are presumed against the spoliator.”2 That inference “rests upon a
logical proposition that one would ordinarily not destroy evidence favorable
to him [or her] self.”3 The corollary is that a person will preserve that which
is beneficial to his or her case.4
The spoliation doctrine can be traced back to the 1722 English case of
Armory v. Delamirie.5 American courts began addressing spoliation in 1794;6
however, in modern times the doctrine has become more nuanced and complex
than a mere Latin phrase. It is particularly important in the area of

U

1

The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and not of any
organization with which he is affiliated. Mr. Berman is a partner at Rifkin, Weiner,
Livingston, Levitan & Silver, LLC. He recently co-authored Referenda in
Maryland: The Need for Comprehensive Statutory Reform, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 655
(2013); co-edited MANAGING E-DISCOVERY AND ESI: FROM PRE-LITIGATION
THROUGH TRIAL (Michael D. Berman, et al., eds., ABA 2011) [hereinafter
MANAGING E-DISCOVERY]; and co-authored Proportionality in the Post-Hoc
Analysis of Pre-Litigation Preservation Decisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 381 (2008),
and Discovery About Discovery: Does the Attorney-Client Privilege Protect All
Attorney-Client Communications Relating to the Preservation of Potentially
Relevant Information?, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 413 (2008). He is an adjunct professor
at the University of Baltimore School of Law, where he teaches an electronic
discovery workshop.
2
Cecil Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Russell, 159 Md. App. 594, 618, 861 A.2d 92,
106 (2004); see also Miller v. Montgomery Cnty., 64 Md. App. 202, 214, 494 A.2d
761, 768 (1985).
3
Russell, 159 Md. App. at 618, 861 A.2d at 106; see also Miller, 64 Md. App. at
214, 494 A.2d at 768.
4
Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. 549, 562, 694 A.2d 150, 156 (1997).
5
Armory v. Delamarie, Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722), described in MANAGING EDISCOVERY, supra note 1.
6
MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 1, at 751 n.12 (citing Bd. of Justices v.
Fennimore, 1 N.J.L., 1794 WL 507 (N.J. 1794)); see also M. KOESEL AND T.
TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE, at xv n.3 (ABA 3d ed. 2013) (referring to the
1800’s).
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electronically stored information (“ESI”) because of the unique characteristics
of that medium.
ESI, and its component and related metadata, is easily destroyed or altered.
Frequently, such metadata is either irrelevant or unimportant; however, often
it has substantive relevance and, almost invariably, it is valuable when ESI is
loaded into software for litigation review. Further, changes to metadata may
call the authenticity of files and their contents into question.7
Metadata may be changed through mere inattention, human error, or
negligence. For example, opening an electronic document will likely alter the
“date accessed” metadata. Copying it will likely change the “date created.”
Routine software or hardware upgrades may alter metadata without
malevolent intent. Scheduled operation of a defragmentation program, which
is commonly provided with computer operating systems to increase efficiency,
may overwrite data.8
Sometimes, however, the changes are not inadvertent. Freeware may be
used to intentionally change a file’s attributes.9 Additionally, modern word
processing software often includes metadata “scrubbers” that are capable of
removing information stored with the electronic document.10
Paradoxically, it is sometimes difficult to destroy ESI, even with
malevolent intent.11 Although it is fragile, ESI is also persistent—it is often
stored in multiple locations and forms. For example, in Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg, LLC, Ms. Zubulake proved spoliation because she had printed

One “way in which electronic evidence may be authenticated under Rule 901(b)(4)
is by examining the metadata for the evidence.” Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co.,
241 F.R.D. 534, 547 (D. Md. 2007) (referring to Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4)); see also
Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 532 (D. Md. 2010).
8
In the current version of Microsoft Windows, a search for “defragmentation” will
open the Disk Defragmenter, which may be run on command or on a periodic basis.
What is Disk Defragmentation?, WINDOWS.MICROSOFT.COM,
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/what-is-diskdefragmentation#1TC=windows-7 (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
9
For example, “Attribute Changer 7.11” advertises that it can change a file’s date
and time stamps. FILEHIPPO, http://filehippo.com/download_attributechanger (last
visited Mar. 3, 2015). “If you just want to replace the item’s stored time stamp
information with the current time frame, you can quickly do that by using the pop-up
menu. It allows you to do that for selected fields only or for all the fields in one
click.” SOFTPEDIA, http://www.softpedia.com/get/System/FileManagement/Attribute-Changer.shtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
10
J. SAMMONS, THE BASICS OF DIGITAL FORENSICS 74 fig. 5.3 (Syngress 2012). For
example, in the recent version of Microsoft Word, clicking on the “File” tab will
lead to an icon to “check for issues.” That icon will permit the user to locate, and
remove, possibly hidden data from the document.
11
Describing a failed attempt to destroy ESI, The Honorable Paul W. Grimm wrote:
“At the end of the day, this is the case of the ‘gang that couldn’t spoliate straight.’”
Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 501.
7
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copies of emails that UBS Warburg failed to produce.12 Additionally, deleted
data may be forensically recoverable. Even “wiping” software that is designed
to overwrite data may leave tell-tale traces of erasure in a computer’s registry
file.13
Spoliation may be considered the flip side of the duty to preserve
potentially responsive information. If there is no duty to preserve information,
destruction or loss of it cannot be spoliation.14 Both are common law doctrines
that have received attention in countless federal decisions, and they are the
subject of a pending proposal to revise the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15
In light of the January 2008 ESI amendments to the Maryland Rules, the
body of federal law, the common law and ethical requirements16 governing
preservation of potentially discoverable information and evidence, and several

217 F.R.D. 309, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“In fact, Zubulake knew that there were
additional responsive e-mails that UBS had failed to produce because she herself had
produced approximately 450 pages of [printed] e-mail correspondence.”)
(subsequent history omitted).
13
Craig Ball, Musings on Electronic Discovery, pp. 110, 201 (2008), available at
http://www.craigball.com/BIYC.pdf.
14
In Columbia Town Center Title Co. v. 100 Inv. Ltd. P’ship, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland made clear that destruction that occurs before the duty to
preserve is triggered is not spoliation: “[T]his is not a spoliation case. The files were
destroyed before appellants knew there was a title problem.” Columbia Town Ctr.
Title Co. v. 100 Inv. Ltd. P'ship, 203 Md. App. 61, 83, 36 A.3d 985, 988 n.6 (2012),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 430 Md. 197, 80 A.3d 1 (2013); accord First Mariner
Bank v. Resolution Law Grp., P.C., CIV. MJG-12-1133, 2014 WL 1652550, at *8-9
(D. Md. Apr. 22, 2014).
15
See e.g., Charles S. Fax, Less Is More: Proposed Rule 37(e) Strikes the Right
Balance, LITIG. NEWS, Summer 2014, at 18, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_news/summer1
4.pdf; Charles S. Fax, Proposed Changes to Federal Rules Prompt Pushback, LITIG.
NEWS, Spring 2014, at 18, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_news/spring14.
pdf; Charles S. Fax, Big Changes on the Horizon for Federal Rules, LITIG. NEWS,
Winter 2014, at 20, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_news/winter14.
pdf. See generally Leslie Wharton & Stephanie Weirick, Duty to Preserve: Best
Practices, Spoliation, Sanctions, and the Safe Harbor Provision, in MANAGING EDISCOVERY, supra note 1, ch. 8.
16
For a discussion of ethical issues in connection with ESI, see generally Md. R.
Prof. Conduct 3.4(a) (lawyer shall not “unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to
evidence or unlawfully alter or destroy material with potential evidentiary value”);
Dennis P. Duffy & Courtney I. Barton, Ethics in E-Discovery, in MANAGING EDISCOVERY, supra note 1, ch. 29; PAUL W. GRIMM & LISA M. YURWIT,
ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION IN MARYLAND AND FEDERAL COURTS:
DISCOVERY, ADMISSIBILITY AND ETHICS Ch. 7 (MICPEL 2008); JOHN M. BARKETT,
THE ETHICS OF E-DISCOVERY (ABA 2009).
12

132

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 45.2

Maryland decisions involving ESI,17 Maryland courts and practitioners should
consider the development of the duty to preserve and the spoliation doctrine
in Maryland courts.18
II. OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY
There are several salient concepts. First, when is the common law duty to
preserve triggered? Second, what is its scope and what are its limits? Third,
if the duty to preserve is breached, what degree of culpability and prejudice
will support what type of sanction? The answers are deceptively simple.
The duty is triggered when litigation is reasonably anticipated. It extends
to potentially responsive information. It is limited by concepts of
proportionality and reasonableness; perfection is not required. When
breached, there may be a need to level the playing field. That may implicate
a wide range of sanctions based on a fact-sensitive inquiry.19
Many Maryland appellate courts have relied on the four-step analysis of
White v. Office of the Public Defender, a 1997 federal decision.20 A persuasive
body of recent case law suggests that spoliation decisions should be made
using what is essentially a three-step analysis: (1) Was the duty to preserve
breached?—(a) Was the duty triggered? (b) If so, what is the scope of the
duty? (c) What are the limits on the scope of the duty?—(2) Was there a
sufficiently culpable state of mind? (3) If the innocent party was prejudiced,
what sanction, if any, is appropriate?
This article will examine the duty to preserve in Section III. Then, Section
IV will define spoliation. Sections V through VIII will explain the state of the
Maryland spoliation doctrine, providing analysis under both the Maryland
Rules and decisions of Maryland courts. Section IX will then suggest a threestep analysis for approaching spoliation issues. Finally, the article will end on
a cautionary note.

17

E.g., Sublet v. State, 2015 WL 1826582 (Md. Apr. 23, 2015) (authentication of
text messages).
18
“[O]pting out by seeking refuge in the state court system is no longer an option.”
J. Mark Coulson, Maryland Courts No Longer Safe Haven for E-Discovery
Resistors, 43 MD. BAR J. 32, 35 (2010).
19
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, The Sedona Conference Commentary on Legal Holds:
The Trigger & The Process, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 265, 269 (2010) [hereinafter
Sedona Conference Commentary].
20
City Homes v. Hazelwood, 210 Md. App. 615, 670, 63A.3d 713, 746 (2013), cert.
denied, 432 Md. 468, 69 A.3d 476 (2013), citing Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App.
179, 194-97, 728 A.2d 727, cert. denied, 355 Md. 612, 735 A.2d 1107 (1999), both
in turn citing White v. Office of the Pub. Defender, 170 F.R.D. 138 (D. Md. 1997).
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III. THE DUTY TO PRESERVE: ITS TRIGGER, SCOPE, AND LIMITS
A. The Common Law Duty to Preserve is Triggered by the Reasonable
Anticipation of Litigation
As a general principle, “[u]nless otherwise required by law, no individual
or entity is required to preserve records.”21 The common law duty to preserve
is triggered when litigation becomes reasonably anticipated.22 Sedona
Conference Guideline 1 states that there is reasonable anticipation when there
is a credible probability that an organization will become involved in
litigation.23 Guideline 4 suggests that this an objective determination to be
made in good faith after a reasonable evaluation.24 There is no one-size-fitsall checklist.25
B. The Scope of the Duty Encompasses Potentially Responsive
Information
Determining the scope of the duty to preserve has been described as one of
the most vexing issues in e-discovery.26 As noted by The Honorable Shira A.
Scheindlin, while the duty’s “broad contours” are “relatively clear,” the
obligation “cannot be defined with precision.”27

21

PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE (ABA 2d ed. 2008).
For additional detail, see Paul W. Grimm et al., Proportionality in the Post-Hoc
Analysis of Pre-Litigation Preservation Decisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 381, 388
n.27 (2008) [hereinafter Grimm et al., Proportionality]. As with any general rule,
there are a number of exceptions. See, e.g., Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 836
F.2d 1104 (8th Cir) (remanding for factual determination of whether facially neutral
destruction policy was an artifice to evade duty to preserve information about
alleged unsafe firearm).
22
For a discussion of the multiple sources of the duty other than common law, see
Grimm et al., Proportionality, supra note 21, at 388-39. The discussion in this article
is limited to the common law duty to preserve.
23
Sedona Conference Commentary, supra note 19, at 269. Publications of the
Sedona Conference are cited extensively in comments to the January 2008
amendments to the Maryland Rules. A prior iteration of the Sedona Commentary
required a credible “threat,” and that reference has properly been removed.
24
Id. at 270.
25
Id. at 271 (providing concrete examples of fact patterns that would, or would not,
trigger the duty).
26
Grimm et al., Proportionality, supra note 21, at 385 (quotation to Kenneth Withers
omitted).
27
Id. at 392-93 (citing to Scheindlin, J.).
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The duty has been described as a duty to preserve “potentially relevant
evidence.”28 Thus, it has been linked to the scope of discovery.29 While that
is a helpful rule of thumb, it is often too narrow because information that need
not be produced in discovery may be subject to the duty to preserve. To
provide one example, a backup tape may be subject to the duty to preserve but,
because it may be costly to restore, may not be subject to the duty to produce.30
Further, because the parameters of discovery are often unclear, defining the
scope of the duty to preserve in terms of the scope of discovery may be of little
practical assistance.31 This dilemma may lead a potential litigant to overpreserve, unreasonably increasing the cost of litigation.32
C. Proportionality Limits the Scope of the Duty
It is axiomatic that the law should not compel a litigant to spend $50,000
preserving information for a $5,000 case.33 That axiom illustrates the principle
of proportionality. In the discovery context, it is embodied in the cost-benefit
analysis of Maryland Rule 2-402(b).34
28

Id. at 396 (quoting Paul Rice) (internal quotations omitted). Restricting the duty
to “evidence” may be too narrow.
29
Id. at 385, 396 (citation omitted).
30
Two conceptual examples, among others, may be found in Maryland Rules 2402(b)(1) and 2-402(b)(2). Under Rule 2-402(b)(2) information that is not readily
accessible due to undue burden or cost may not need to be produced in discovery,
yet it may be subject to the duty to preserve. Similarly, information that need not be
produced under the cost-benefit test of Rule 2-402(b)(1) may still be subject to the
duty to preserve.
31
Grimm et al., Proportionality, supra note 21, at 397.
32
Id. at 403, 407, 411.
33
Id. at 407-11; accord Theodore Hirt, Applying "Proportionality" Principles in
Electronic Discovery – Lessons for Federal Agencies and Their Litigators, U.S.
ATTORNEYS’ BULL., May 2011, at 46-47, available at
http://justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5903.pdf.
34
Maryland Rule 2-402(b) provides:
The court shall limit the frequency or extent of use of the
discovery methods otherwise permitted under these rules if it
determines that (A) the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative or is obtainable from some other source
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (B)
the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (C) the
burden or cost of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit, taking into account the complexity of the case, the amount
in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues
at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed
discovery in resolving the issues.
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It has been suggested that proportionality and cost-benefit analysis provide
the best tools for analyzing and limiting the scope of the duty to preserve.35
For example, Sedona Conference Guideline 6 suggests that the duty to
preserve be “applied proportionately.”36 A corollary is that perfection is not
required; reasonable efforts are.37 When information that should have been
preserved is not, the failure may present an issue of spoliation.
IV. DEFINITION OF SPOLIATION
Spoliation has been described as a word with “evil connotations.”38 In
Keyes v. Hereman, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland defined
spoliation as the intentional destruction, mutilation, alteration, or concealment
of evidence, usually a document.39 In Cost v. State, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland wrote that the “term ‘spoliation,’ moreover, is often associated with
egregious or bad faith actions, and not for cases involving negligent
destruction or loss.”40

35

Grimm et al., Proportionality, supra note 21, at 405. See Mancia v. Mayflower
Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008), and Marens v. Carrabba’s Italian
Grill, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 35 (D. Md. 2000), for examples of cases applying
proportionality analysis.
36
Sedona Conference Commentary, supra note 19, at 270.
37
See, e.g., Michael D. Berman, What Does “The Making of a Surgeon” Have to Do
With ESI and “Software Glitches?”, MICHAEL D. BERMAN BLOG (July 15, 2011),
http://www.esi-mediation.com/what-does-%e2%80%9cthe-making-of-asurgeon%e2%80%9d-have-to-do-with-esi-and-software-glitches/ (demonstrating
that perfection is not, and never has been, the applicable standard in evaluating ESI
issues). Similarly, Sedona Principle 5 provides for “reasonable and good faith”
efforts to preserve, and states that “it is unreasonable to expect parties to take every
conceivable step to preserve all potentially relevant electronically stored
information.” THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE DATABASE
PRINCIPLES ADDRESSING THE PRESERVATION AND PRODUCTION OF DATABASES AND
DATABASE INFORMATION IN CIVIL LITIGATION 189 (2014 ed.), available at
https://thesedonaconference.org/system/files/sites/sedona.civicactions.net/files/privat
e/drupal/filesys/publications/The%20Sedona%20Conference%20Database%20Princi
ples_2014%20Edition.pdf.
38
MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE, xvi
(Daniel F. Gourash ed., ABA 3d ed. 2013) (quoting United Med. Supply Co. v. U.S.,
77 Fed. Cl. 257, 276 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
39
Keyes v. Lerman, 191 Md. App. 533, 537, 992 A.2d 519, 522 (2010) (quoting
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1437 (8th ed. 2004)).
40
Cost v. State, 417 Md. 360, 369, 10 A.3d 184, 190 (2010).
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Other definitions do not include the word “intentional,”41 and some courts
have found spoliation based on negligence.42 The Sedona Conference glossary
states: “Spoliation is the destruction of records or properties, such as metadata,
that may be relevant to ongoing or anticipated litigation, government
investigation or audit.”43 The Sedona Conference has also suggested that in
order for there to be spoliation, there must be a “knowing violation of an
established duty” or “a reckless disregard amounting to gross negligence.”44
The spoliation doctrine has been variously recognized as an independent
tort, a defense to recovery, an evidentiary inference or presumption, a
discovery sanction, a substantive rule of law, and a rule of evidence or
procedure.45 Spoliation is not an independent tort in Maryland.46
Colloquially, one person’s trash is another person’s treasure.47 One ESI
decision suggested:
Aside perhaps from perjury, no act serves to threaten the
integrity of the judicial process more than the spoliation of
evidence. Our adversarial process is designed to tolerate
human failings—erring judges can be reversed, uncooperative
counsel can be shepherded, and recalcitrant witnesses
compelled to testify. But, when critical documents go
missing, judges and litigants alike descend into a world of ad

41

Miller v. Montgomery Cnty., 64 Md. App. 202, 214, 494 A.2d 761, 767-68
(1985). See generally Leslie Wharton & Stephanie Weirick, Duty to Preserve: Best
Practices, Spoliation, Sanctions, and the Safe Harbor Provision, in MANAGING EDISCOVERY, supra note 1, ch. 8, at 234.
42
See generally Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 542-53
(D. Md. 2010) (for a chart of the varying culpability standards in federal courts
across the nations).
43
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E–DISCOVERY
& DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 48 (2d ed. 2007), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/misc Files/TSCGlossary_12_07.pdf,
quoted in Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 516.
44
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: SECOND EDITION, BEST
PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 70 (2d ed. June 2007), available at
https://thesedonaconference.org/system/files/sites/sedona.civicactions.net/files/privat
e/drupal/filesys/publications/TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf.
45
Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179, 198, 728 A.2d 727, 736 (1999).
46
See Goin v. Shoppers Food Warehouse, 166 Md. App. 611, 890 A.2d 894 (2006);
Md. Jockey Club of Balt. City, Inc. v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 2364, 2002 WL
32123994 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 17, 2002); Miller v. Montgomery Cnty., 64 Md.
App. 202, 494 A.2d 761 (1985); Peamon v. H&S Bakery, Inc., et al., No. 8-487,
2008 WL 6843228 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. Cnty. July 17, 2008).
47
United Med. Supply Co. v. U.S., 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 258 (2007).
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hocery and half measures—and our civil justice system
suffers.48
V. THE SPOLIATION DOCTRINE UNDER THE MARYLAND RULES
The Maryland Rules were amended as of January 1, 2008, to address
electronic discovery.49 Maryland Rule 2-433(a) authorizes a court to impose
such orders as are “just” in regard to a failure of discovery.50 It has been held
to permit spoliation sanctions.51
Maryland Rule 2-433(b) provides a limited “safe harbor,” by precluding
spoliation sanctions, “under these Rules,” if ESI “is no longer available as a
result of the routine, good-faith operations of an electronic information
system,” except under exceptional circumstances.52 The limits of the
protection afforded by Maryland Rule 2-433(b) have been authoritatively
well-described elsewhere.53 As noted therein, the protection does not apply if
there are exceptional circumstances, a term that is not defined. Further it
applies only to routine, good faith losses. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, “the limitation on the court's ability to sanction for the loss or
destruction of ESI under amended Md. Rule 2-433(b) is to the imposition of
sanctions ‘under this rule.’ The court still retains its inherent authority to
impose sanctions for a failure to preserve, in appropriate circumstances.”54
Thus, the Maryland Rule 2-433 “safe harbor” provides no protection from
sanctions under sources of authority that are not based on the Maryland Rules,
nor does it provide protection after litigation has become reasonably
anticipated.

48

Id. at 258-59.
J. Mark Coulson, Maryland Courts No Longer Safe Haven for E-Discovery
Resistors, 43 MD. B. J. 32 (2010) (discussing a number of Maryland Rules that apply
specifically to ESI).
50
Md. Rule 2-433(a).
51
Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179, 194, 728 A.2d 727, 734 (1999).
52
See Md. Rule 2-433(b).
53
GRIMM & YURWIT, supra note 16, ch. 1, at 1-20; see also Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991) (discussing a court’s inherent powers); Klupt, 126
Md. App. at 196-97, 728 A.2d at 735 (discussing inherent authority of the courts to
regulate discovery). See generally Leslie Wharton & Stephanie Weirick, Duty to
Preserve: Best Practices, Spoliation, Sanctions, and the Safe Harbor Provision, in
MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 1, ch. 8, at 235 n.45.
54
GRIMM & YURWIT, supra note 16, at 8 (citing Weaver v. ZeniMax Media, Inc.,
175 Md. App. 16, 923 A.2d 1032, cert. denied, 401 Md. 174, 931 A.2d 1097 (2007)
(recognizing the trial court's inherent authority to impose sanctions for spoliation of
evidence that took place prior to the commencement of litigation and, hence, outside
the reach of the rules of procedure); Klupt, 126 Md. App. 179, 728 A.2d 727
(holding that the circuit court had inherent authority to impose sanctions for
destruction of evidence)).
49
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Like the Federal Rules, the Maryland Rules do not specify when a
spoliation motion must be filed. Unlike their federal counterparts, Maryland
courts have not addressed when a spoliation motion should or must be filed,
or when it should be decided.55 Guideline 2 of the Proposed Revisions to the
Discovery Guidelines of the Maryland State Bar suggests that attorneys
propose milestone dates for spoliation motions.56
VI. THE SPOLIATION DOCTRINE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
A. Antecedents of the Modern Doctrine of Spoliation
Maryland courts have addressed spoliation since at least the 1880’s. In an
early spoliation case, Love v. Dilley, the decedent had left money to his
beneficiaries, but advancements made to them during his life were to be
deducted from the corpus so that equal shares would be left.57 Notes showing
advancements to one group existed; notes to the other group were destroyed.58
In essence, the papers favorable to Barney Dilley and his group were
preserved but those that were unfavorable had gone missing. The court
determined that the loss was designed to prevent equitable distribution.59 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland wrote: “There could be but one conceivable
purpose in putting these papers out of the way. The spoliation, by whomsoever
committed, was intended to promote the interest of Barney Dilley, the
Edwards, and the Everetts, by relieving them from the necessity of bringing
them into the hotchpot.”60
The court then addressed the remedy:
It is our duty to prevent the contemplated injustice by all the
legitimate means in our power. Exact justice is out of the
question; it has been prevented by the destruction of the
means of attaining it. We can, however, charge these
[spoliating] parties with such sums as the evidence shows they

55

See, e.g., Michael D. Berman, Timing of Spoliation Motions: Goodman v. Praxair
Services, Inc., in MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 1, app. C (discussing the
time at which a spoliation motion should or must be filed).
56
MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE DISCOVERY
GUIDELINES OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR, at 3 (2014), available at
http://www.msba.org/uploadedFiles/
MSBA/Member_Groups/Sections/Litigation/GuidelinesDRAFT061214.pdf.
57
Love v. Dilley, 64 Md. 238, 1 A. 59, 59-60 (1885), modified, 64 Md. 238, 4 A.
290 (1886).
58
Id. at 239, 1 A. at 59-60.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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received from Joseph Dilley in his life-time, and require them
to exonerate themselves by proper proof.61
It reasoned that “the blame must rest on those who have destroyed or
concealed the evidence . . . .”62 The court permitted the non-spoliating party
to rely on secondary evidence:
Of course, if [the decedent’s] notes and papers could be
obtained, there could not be the least difficulty in ascertaining
these different amounts, and in making a perfectly fair
division of his property among his children. But as in some
instances they have disappeared, we are of necessity obliged
to rely upon the more uncertain and unsatisfactory evidence
set forth in the record. It is morally impossible that our
conclusions should be accurate. We at best can only hope to
make an approximation to true results. But the blame must
rest on those who have destroyed or concealed the evidence
which would remove all obscurity on the subject; and when,
from the want of this proof, we fall into errors, the loss will
justly fall on those whose misconduct has destroyed the
means of arriving at the truth.63
In an early application of the modern adverse inference doctrine, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland wrote in odium spoliatoris omnia præsumuntur.64 It
explained:
If a person is proved to have defaced or destroyed any written
instrument, a presumption arises that if the truth had appeared
it would have been against his interest, and that his conduct is
attributable to his knowledge of this circumstance, and,
accordingly, slight evidence of the contents of the instrument
will usually, in such a case, be sufficient. In dealing with the
difficulties of this case we have endeavored to draw from the
competent evidence in the record only such conclusions as
seemed to us legitimate and reasonable.65

61

Id. at 291, 1 A. at 64 (emphasis added).
Id. at 239, 1 A. at 60.
63
Love, 64 Md. at 239, 1 A. at 60.
64
Id. at 246, 1 A. at 64 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
65
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
62
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B. The Modern Doctrine of Spoliation
In Cost v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that “’spoliation’
is often used in civil cases, where parties withhold or destroy evidence
strategically.”66 Cost was a criminal case; however, the court contrasted the
civil spoliation doctrine with the criminal “missing evidence” analysis.67 Cost
was convicted after allegedly stabbing a fellow inmate. The State took certain
physical evidence into custody and later discarded it. The court held that it
was error to refuse Cost’s request for a jury instruction: “Maryland recognizes
some form of jury instructions regarding missing or destroyed evidence in both
civil and the criminal contexts. In the civil context, we give a jury instruction
for the ‘spoliation of evidence’ where a party has destroyed or failed to
produce evidence.”68 The court then quoted the pattern civil jury instruction:
The destruction of or the failure to preserve evidence by a
party may give rise to an inference unfavorable to that party.
If you find that the intent was to conceal the evidence, the
destruction or failure to preserve must be inferred to indicate
that the party believes that his or her case is weak and that he
or she would not prevail if the evidence was preserved. If you
find that the destruction or failure to preserve the evidence
was negligent, you may, but are not required to, infer that the
evidence, if preserved, would have been unfavorable to that
party.69
The Cost court rested its analysis on the principle that “one does not
ordinarily withhold evidence that is beneficial to one's case.”70 It emphasized
that: “The instruction does not require that a jury make an adverse inference
in situations involving the spoliation of evidence; rather, it merely permits

66

Cost v. State, 417 Md. 360, 369, 10 A.3d 184, 190 (2010).
This article addresses only civil cases. In the criminal context, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has described the term “spoliation” as imprecise and
misleading. Cost, 417 Md. at 369, 10 A.3d at 190. For some opinions addressing
the doctrine in the criminal context, see Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677, 694-99, 741
A.2d 1119, 1128-30 (1999) (due process); Butler v. State, 214 Md. App. 635, 66264, 78 A.3d 887, 903-04 (2013) (alleged unavailable witness); Hajireen v. State, 203
Md. App. 537, 558-61, 39 A.3d 105, 118-20 (2012); Grymes v. State, 202 Md. App.
70, 113-14, 30 A.3d 1032, 1057 (2011); and Tetso v. State, 205 Md. App. 334, 45
A.3d 788 (2012).
68
Cost, 427 Md. at 370, 369 A.3d at 190.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 370, 369 A.3d at 190 (quoting Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. 549,
562, 694 A.2d 150, 156 (1997)).
67
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such an inference.”71 The Court of Appeals of Maryland explained: “For the
judicial system to function fairly, one party in a case cannot be permitted to
gain an unfair advantage through the destruction of evidence.”72
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has repeatedly stated that the spoliation
doctrine does not provide substantive proof.73 Instead, the destruction of
evidence after a duty to preserve has arisen raises an inference that the
destroyed evidence was unfavorable to the spoliator. Further, in the unique
context of a spoliated will, the will’s contents may be proven by secondary

71

Id. at 370-71, 396 A.3d at 190-91 (explanatory footnote omitted) (citing Joseph F.
Murphy, MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 409 (4th ed. 2010) (“Destruction of
evidence permits, but does not require, an inference that the evidence would have
been unfavorable to the position of the party who destroyed the evidence.”)).
72
Cost, 427 Md. at 381, 396 A.3d at 197.
73
On the issue of substantive proof, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has written,
“Even in evidence spoliation cases, the fact finder is not permitted to find the
destruction of evidence to be substantive proof that the evidence was unfavorable.”
Bereano v. State Ethics Comm’n, 403 Md. 716, 747, 944 A.2d 538, 556 (2008).
“Although an inference arises from the suppression of evidence by a litigant that this
evidence would be unfavorable to his cause, it is well settled that this inference does
not amount to substantive proof and cannot take the place of proof of a fact
necessary to the other party’s case.” Maszczenski v. Myers, 212 Md. 346, 355, 129
A.2d 109, 114 (1957) (citations omitted); accord Larsen v. Romeo, 254 Md. 220,
228, 255 A.2d 387, 391 (1969) (“As a general rule, an inference arises from the
suppression or destruction of evidence by a litigant that such evidence would be
unfavorable to his case. However, this inference does not amount to substantive
proof and can not take the place of proof of a fact necessary to the other party’s
case.”) (citation omitted). Similarly, the Court of Special Appeals has stated that:
[A] presumption does not necessarily shift the burden of
persuasion. Rather, it merely satisfies the burden of going forward
on a fact presumed and may satisfy the burden of persuasion if no
rebuttal evidence is introduced by the other side. When the
responding party introduces rebutting evidence, the presumption
often is sufficient to generate a jury question on the issue, despite
the fact that the beneficiary of the presumption has not produced
any other evidence on the subject. . . . Stated differently, the party
favored by the presumption is not relieved of the requirement of
presenting evidence to establish a prima facie case as to those
issues for which he bears the burden of proof if the adverse party
sufficiently rebuts the presumption.
Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. 549, 564, 694 A.2d 150, 157 (1997).
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evidence,74 and the doctrine permits a presumption to supply the suppressed
proof.75
In Hoffman v. Stamper, Hoffman (a defendant who was the appraiser in an
alleged house-flipping scheme) destroyed documents “in direct violation of
HUD and ethical requirements applicable to appraisers,” and “deliberately
destroyed all of his notes once [alleged flipper] Beeman's activities came to
public attention.”76 The destruction was spoliation and raised an inference that
the destroyed documents were unfavorable to Hoffman: “From that spoliation
alone the jury was entitled to infer that those notes would have been
detrimental to Hoffman's defense, that they would not have supported what he
said from the witness stand.”77
In Larsen v. Romeo, Romeo’s tractor-trailer rear-ended Larsen’s vehicle.78
Romeo asserted that, in part, the incident was caused by sudden, unforeseeable
failure of the truck’s air brakes. After the collision, Romeo (or a mechanic)79
took a piece of air hose from the tractor, observed a leak, and then threw it
away. Larsen asserted that spoliation provided proof that the air hose had not
failed. The court disagreed. It stated the general rule that suppression or
destruction of evidence supports an inference that the evidence would have
been unfavorable to the spoliator. It then stated that “this inference does not
amount to substantive proof and cannot take the place of proof of a fact
74

For a discussion suggesting a greater role for secondary evidence in the sanctions
analysis, see MICHAEL D. BERMAN & RACHEL A. SHAPIRO, The Secondary Evidence
Rule in Avoidance of Spoliation Sanctions, in MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note
1, ch. 10.
75
The Court of Appeals of Maryland wrote, in the will context, that:
[I]f necessary, the law will prevent the perpetration of a fraud by
permitting a presumption to supply the suppressed proof. We
cannot assent to the proposition that the statute is so rigid as to be
the wrongdoer’s most effective weapon. The misconduct once
established to the satisfaction of the jury, it is no hardship to the
wrongdoer to say, ‘Produce the evidence in your possession, or we
will presume that your opponent’s contention is true.’ When one
deliberately destroys, or purposely induces another to destroy, a
written instrument of any kind, and the contents of such instrument
subsequently become a matter of judicial inquiry between the
spoliator and an innocent party, the latter will not be required to
make strict proof of the contents of such instrument in order to
establish a right founded thereon.
Preston v. Preston, 149 Md. 498, 132 A. 55, 61 (1926).
76
Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 27, 867 A.2d 276, 292 (2005).
77
Id., 867 A.2d at 292.
78
Larsen v. Romeo, 254 Md. 220, 255 A.2d 387 (1969).
79
It was not clear whether Romeo or a mechanic had removed the piece of hose.
Romeo, 254 Md. at 224.
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necessary to the other party.” It concluded that, at most, the inference would
show “that that particular piece of hose, which may or may not have been part
of the brake system, was not defective. Such an inference does not negate
Romeo’s testimony that his brakes failed.”80
The Larsen court relied on Maszczenski v. Meyers, a decision in which a
child was injured in a fall from a broken swing. 81 The defendant discarded a
link from the chain that held the swing before the plaintiff could examine it.82
The court noted no “statutory presumption here,” and wrote:
Probably Mr. Myers should not have disposed of the link.
There is of course no evidence here that he disposed of the
link intentionally for the purpose of concealing the fact that it
had opened. It could hardly be contended that throwing away
the broken link was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that
an inspection of the link before the accident would have
revealed the latent defect.
80

In explaining Larsen, the Court of Appeals of Maryland wrote:
Both Larsen and DiLeo were cases in which one party
destroyed potential evidence. Nonproduction of evidence does not
automatically equate with destruction of evidence. Petitioner offers
no evidence that the police purposely suppressed or destroyed the
jacket. The record reveals that the police accurately reported the
existence of the jacket during the inventory search of the vehicle.
While the defendant may have considered the jacket to be relevant
evidence, there is little evidence that the police considered it to be
evidence, and ever held it as evidence. Larsen and DiLeo point to
intent or motive behind the destruction as essential to the drawing
of the inference. Therefore, those cases do not aid petitioner
because, not only is there no evidence that the police destroyed the
jacket, petitioner has not established what the police motive or
intent behind destroying the jacket would be.

Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677, 696, 741 A.2d 1119, 1129 (1999) (citing Dileo v.
Nugent, 88 Md. App. 59, 592 A.2d 1126 (1991), appeal dismissed, 327 Md. 627,
612 A.2d 257 (1992); Larsen v. Romeo, 254 Md. 220, 255 A.2d 387 (1969)).
81
Maszczenski v. Meyers, 212 Md. 346, 129 A.2d 109 (1957).
82
The court wrote:
The appellants in their brief admit: “It is true, as stated by the Court, that
there was no evidence in the case to show that if an inspection was made 10
minutes before it broke would have disclosed it was going to break.”
However, they claim that this was because Mr. Myers threw away the
broken link and they had no opportunity to examine it.
Id. at 354, 129 A.2d at 113.
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The court noted that, although an inference may arise from suppression, it was
well-settled that the inference is not substantive proof.83
VII. THE SPOLIATION DOCTRINE IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
DiLeo v. Nugent was a medical malpractice action.84 A patient alleged that
a therapist had participated in illicit drug use and had sexual contact with her.85
He advised her to keep a journal and, during the nine month occurrence, the
patient kept an 800-page journal. She destroyed it, after consulting an
attorney, because she feared that she would commit suicide and the journal
would upset her family.86 The circuit judge instructed the jury that destruction
of evidence gives rise to inferences unfavorable to the spoliator. Not only was
that instruction held to be proper, it was also held to be proper to refuse to
instruct on destruction with fraudulent intent because the patient provided
explanations for her failure to produce the journal.87
Miller v. Montgomery County, involved an auto tort. One question was
whether a minor movement controller component (“MM3”) had caused an

83

Id. at 355, 129 A.2d at 114.
DiLeo v. Nugent, 88 Md. App. 59, 592 A.2d 1126 (1991), appeal dismissed, 327
Md. 627, 612 A.2d 257 (1992).
85
The therapist did not testify, and the court gave a “missing witness” instruction.
The court wrote:
84

When a party in a civil case refuses to take the stand to testify as to
facts peculiarly within his knowledge, the trial court or jury may
infer that the testimony not produced would have been
unfavorable. The unfavorable inference applies, however, only
where it would be natural under the circumstances for a party to
speak, call witnesses or present evidence.
DiLeo, 88 Md. App. at 69, 592 A.2d at 1131. Because the events that occurred were
within the therapist’s “peculiar knowledge,” the instruction was proper. Similarly:
In a civil case it is well settled that failure of a party to produce an available
witness who could testify on a material issue, if not explained, gives rise to
an inference that the testimony would be unfavorable, and is a legitimate
subject of comment by counsel in argument to the jury.
Hoverter v. Dir. of Patuxent Inst., 231 Md. 608, 609, 188 A.2d 696, 697 (1963)
(commenting on failure to call a psychiatrist to testify in civil commitment hearing).
86
DiLeo, 88 Md. App. at 70 n.5, 592 A.2d at 1131 n.5.
87
As noted in Patterson v. State, “Nonproduction of evidence does not automatically
equate to destruction of evidence.” Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677, 696, 741 A.2d
1119, 1129 (1999) (differentiating Larsen and DiLeo as “cases in which one party
destroyed potential evidence”).
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intermittent red traffic light.88 The plaintiff filed a count for fraudulent
destruction of evidence, alleging that the MM3 was removed after the
occurrence and the county had been in possession of, and altered, the MM3
before an expert could examine it. The court wrote:
The destruction or alteration of evidence by a party gives rise
to inferences or presumptions unfavorable to the spoliator, the
nature of the inference being dependent upon the intent or
motivation of the party. Unexplained and intentional
destruction of evidence by a litigant gives rise to an inference
that the evidence would have been unfavorable to his cause,
but would not in itself amount to substantive proof of a fact
essential to his opponent's cause . . . . 89
The remedy would have been “appropriate jury instructions as to permissible
inferences,” and the court held that it was not error to sustain a demurrer to the
separate count alleging spoliation.
Subsequently, in Anderson v. Litzenberg, Litzenberg obtained a verdict for
damages arising out of a traffic accident. 90 While he was driving behind
defendant’s truck, a tarpaulin came loose from the truck and struck an
oncoming vehicle. The oncoming vehicle lost control and crashed into
Litzenberg. At the scene, a state trooper noted a frayed or broken cable that
had been connected to the tarp. Thereafter, potential evidence was discarded:
The tarp and cables remained on the truck until an adjuster for
[defendant and employer of defendant truck driver] Bramble's
insurer inspected the tarp system. After the inspection,
Bramble maintenance personnel removed the tarp system and
discarded its remnants except for a segment of cable that
[Bramble’s director of truck operations] Mr. Dimaggio had
cut off. According to Mr. Dimaggio's trial testimony, he
retained that particular segment of cable because he believed
that it was the component of the tarp system that had failed.
At trial, he ultimately conceded under cross-examination that
he might have anticipated the possibility of a claim arising out
88

Miller v. Montgomery Cnty., 64 Md. App. 202, 494 A.2d 761 (1985), cert denied,
304 Md. 299 (1985). Prior to Miller, in Burkowske v. Church Hosp. Corp., the court
held that an adverse inference due to a hospital destroying a bench that had
collapsed, resulting in personal injury would have been “unavailing” because “[a]t
best, the unfavorable inference here would be that the bench was defective; no
inference would necessarily arise that the hospital knew of the defect.” Burkowske v.
Church Hosp. Corp., 50 Md. App. 515, 524, 439 A.2d 40, 45 (1982), cert. denied,
293 Md. 331, 439 A.2d 40 (1982).
89
Miller, 64 Md. App. at 214, 494 A.2d at 768.
90
Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. 549, 694 A.2d 150 (1997).
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of the injuries caused by the tarp system's malfunction. At the
time that Bramble discarded the remnants of the tarp system,
however, no claims stemming from the 22 April accident
were pending.91
The relevant defendants (now appellants) challenged the jury
instruction that “destruction of evidence by a person gives rise
to an inference or presumption unfavorable to spoiler, and,
secondly, if the intent was to conceal the nature of the defect
the destruction must be inferred to indicate a weakness in the
case.”
The Anderson court relied on Miller for the proposition that a jury instruction
was the proper remedy:
Miller makes clear that two levels of inferences could have
been drawn from Bramble's discarding most of the tarp
system. If the jury concluded that Bramble's decision to throw
away the tarp was merely the product of innocent mistake, the
jury could still presume that, at the time of the accident, the
tarp was in a defective, or otherwise unfavorable, condition.
If, on the other hand, the jury was convinced that Bramble had
a fraudulent intent to conceal the nature of the tarp's defective
condition, the jury could also infer Bramble's consciousness
of the fact that its case was weak. Thus, under Miller, an
adverse presumption may arise against the spoliator even if
there is no evidence of fraudulent intent. As such, the judge's
revised instruction fully comported with our pronouncement
of Maryland law concerning spoilation [sic] of evidence in
Miller and was, therefore, an accurate statement of Maryland
law on this issue.92
Thus, the Anderson court made clear that a showing of bad faith is not a
prerequisite to an adverse inference against the spoliator: “Simply put, one
does not ordinarily withhold evidence that is beneficial to one's case. Indeed,
the converse is equally true: one maintains evidence that one believes will be
beneficial to one's case.”93

91

Id. at 558-59, 694 A.2d at 154-55. The court did not discuss whether litigation
was reasonably anticipated.
92
Id. at 561-62, 694 A.2d at 156.
93
Id. at 562, 694 A.2d at 156; cf. Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677, 696, 741 A.2d
1119, 1129 (1999) (“Larsen and DiLeo point to intent or motive behind the
destruction as essential to the drawing of the inference. Therefore, those cases do not
aid petitioner because, not only is there no evidence that the police destroyed the
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In Klupt v. Krongard, dismissal of a counterclaim was affirmed due to the
willful destruction of discoverable electronic evidence.94 The spoliator was
served with a discovery request for electronic records.95 He had secretly taperecorded a number of telephone conversations related to the invention at issue
in the lawsuit, asserting that he was under the mistaken impression that only
one party needed to consent to recording.96 He then typed memoranda of the
recordings and “destroyed the recordings after they had been sought in
discovery.”97 After a number of disputes, “Klupt was forced to admit [in
deposition] that he had tape-recorded his conversations with the appellees.”98
He eventually conceded that he destroyed them after the case had been pending
for six months and after requests for production had been served.
The motion for sanctions asserted a course of deceptive conduct: “Klupt
made surreptitious recordings of telephone conversations from which he made
memoranda; he intentionally destroyed the tape recordings; he created dummy
versions from the original memoranda; he withheld both the original and
dummy memoranda; he falsely affirmed in his deposition that he had produced
all documents.”99
The court commenced its analysis by explaining the broad range of
sanctions and discretion permitted under Maryland Rule 2-433.100 It then
wrote:

jacket, petitioner has not established what the police motive or intent behind
destroying the jacket would be.”).
94
Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179, 198, 728 A.2d 727, 736 (1999); City
Homes, Inc. v. Hazelwood, 210 Md. App. 615, 700, 63 A.3d 713, 763, cert. denied,
432 Md. 468, 69 A.3d 476 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
95
Klupt, 126 Md. App. at 185, 728 A.2d at 730.
96
Id. at 185-86, 728 A.2d at 730.
97
Id. at 188, 728 A.2d at 731.
98
Id. at 189, 728 A.2d at 732.
99
Id. at 190, 728 A.2d at 732.
100
Klupt, 126 Md. App. at 194, 728 A.2d at 734. In addition to the sanctions
discussed elsewhere in this article, the danger of spoliation may be a basis for
requesting appointment of a receiver. Spivery-Jones v. Receivership Estate of Trans
Healthcare, Inc., 438 Md. 330, 337, 342, 91 A.3d 1172, 1176, 1179 (2014); cf.
Boland v. Boland, 423 Md. 296, 364, 31 A.3d 529, 570 (2011) (discussing failure to
demonstrate fraud, spoliation, or imminent danger sufficient to appoint a receiver);
First Union Sav. & Loan, Inc. v. Bottom, 232 Md. 292, 297, 193 A.2d 49, 52 (1963);
Brown v. Brown, 204 Md. 197, 211, 103 A.2d 856, 863 (1954) (power is to be
exercised with great caution). See generally Hagerstown Furniture Co. of
Washington Cnty. v. Baker, 155 Md. 549, 549, 142 A. 885, 886 (1928); Williams v.
Messick, 177 Md. 605, 608, 11 A.2d 472, 473 (1940) (on addressing waste by a
controlling shareholder). For an opinion in the context of the statute of limitations,
see Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 499-500, 914 A.2d 735, 753
(2007) (“In the majority of instances, the time elapsed between the rendition of
notice and effectuation of a termination is not so long as to foster relevant evidence
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The [Maryland] Rules do not deal explicitly with the
destruction of discoverable evidence. But they do clearly
allow for the dismissal of a party's claims for failure to
respond to a request for production and for failure to obey an
order compelling such a response or the actual production
itself. Destruction of evidence such as was found in this case
would render hollow any response to a request for production,
even if timely filed, just as it would render an order to compel
moot. If dismissal is permissible in those cases, it would seem
to be a fortiori permissible in a case of destruction of
discoverable evidence.101
The court looked to federal authority and concluded that the Maryland Rules
also permitted sanctions for such destruction.102
The Klupt court found authority in two sources. First, the court concluded
“that such an expansive reading of the discovery rules gives trial courts the
discretion to impose Rule sanctions for the destruction of evidence, a
discovery abuse not directly covered by the Rules.”103 It then wrote:
Given the importance and novelty in Maryland of the issue of
sanctions for destruction of discoverable evidence, we will
not, however, rest our decision solely on this basis. Rather,
we will also consider the inherent authority of the court to
regulate the discovery process. When, as here, there is little
Maryland precedent, we look to cases interpreting analogous
federal rules.104
The court held that sanctions were supportable under the court’s inherent
power.
The Klupt court rejected the argument that the only sanction available for
spoliation was an adverse inference. It held that the broad discretion conferred
by the discovery rules permitted dismissal as a sanction. It also noted that:
falling victim to fading memories, missing documentation, or other spoliation
concerns.”).
101
Klupt, 126 Md. App. at 194, 728 A.2d at 734.
102
Id. at 196-97, 728 A.2d at 735. For an alternative view of sanctions, see Charles
S. Fax, “A Modest Proposal: Discard Spoliation Sanctions,” Litigation News, Spring
2012, Vol. 37, No. 3 (proposing that “the court should dispense with sanctions and
permit attorneys to offer evidence of spoliation at trial”). This is apparently what
happened in Jarrett v. State, infra note 112.
103
Id. at 195-96, 728 A.2d at 735.
104
Id. at 196, 728 A.2d at 735; accord Weaver v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 175 Md.
App. 16, 923 A.2d 1032, cert. denied, 401 Md. 174, 931 A.2d 1097 (2007) (civil
vigilante).

2015]

The Duty to Preserve ESI & the Spoliation Doctrine

149

[T]he destruction or spoliation of evidence doctrine is itself
flexible and versatile. . . . Consequently, we see absolutely no
contradiction in recognizing that destruction of evidence may
lead to sanctions like dismissal when addressed during
discovery, while the same offense may raise only an
evidentiary presumption when dealt with during trial.105
The Klupt court stated that the discovery rules do not require a showing of
prejudice to support a default judgment for failure to follow those rules.106
Instead, the court required “some commensuration between the abusive
[discovery] conduct and the sanction . . . .”107 Because Klupt had acted
willfully and contumaciously in destroying discoverable evidence with a
hammer, that commensuration was present.
The interplay between discovery sanctions and inherent power was recently
addressed in City Homes v. Hazelwood.108 Noting that a court may impose
sanctions under the Maryland Rules or through its inherent power, the
Hazelwood court held that a litigant “did not appear to engage in spoliation”;
however, the litigant failed to disclose “critically relevant and requested
documents” to his opponent, despite having provided them to his experts.109
That misconduct “interfered with the goal of the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, to provide meaningful access to the justice system by the timely, efficient
and fair processing of all cases,” and it was deemed unprofessional conduct to
withhold critical documents.110 Because the sanctioned attorney “fail[ed] to
produce critical documents responsive to discovery requests,” and to disclose
the finding of the party’s experts, the court reversed the imposition of
sanctions under the circuit court’s inherent power, and remanded for
consideration of whether sanctions should be imposed under Maryland Rule
2-433.111
In Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Connor, the court addressed an unusual
spoliation claim.112 The survivors of a smoker, who was exposed to asbestos,
105

Klupt. 126 Md. App. at 198, 728 A.2d at 736. The court also rejected the
contention that dismissal violated the constitutional right to trial by jury. Id. At 199,
728 A.2d at 736-37.
106
Id. at 201, 728 A.2d at 738.
107
Id.
108
210 Md. App. 615, 669, 63 A.3d 713, 745 (2013), cert. denied, 432 Md. 468, 69
A.3d 476 (2013).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 670, 63 A.3d at 745 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
111
Id. at 670, 63 A.3d at 746. As to the proper form of a notice appealing the
imposition of sanctions on an attorney, see City Homes, 210 Md. at 696-99, 63 A.3d
at 761-63 (2013) (citing Newman v. Reilly, 314 Md. 364, 382-83, 386, 550 A.2d 959
(1988)), cert. denied, 432 Md. 468, 69 A.3d 476 (2013)).
112
Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Connor, 136 Md. App. 91, 764 A.2d 318 (2000).
Hollingsworth involved disposal of the decedent’s body. Id. While “unusual,” it is
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buried the decedent.113 One issue was whether the asbestos exposure was due
to cigarette filters or, alternatively, occupational asbestos exposure. The
defendants asserted spoliation based on the failure to remove and test lung
tissue prior to burial. They requested that the body be exhumed, arguing “that
availability of the lung tissue would have presented [them] with an opportunity
to analyze the fiber burden of the tissue in order to determine the cause of the
mesothelioma.”114 In short, they “accuse[d plaintiff] of deliberate spoliation
of the evidence resulting from the burial of [the deceased] plaintiff’s body
without the removal and testing of [the deceased] plaintiff’s lung tissue.”115
In rejecting the argument, the court concluded that the defendants
“astoundingly compare the burial of a loved one to the destruction of
documents.”116 It wrote that plaintiff’s family respected the rights of the
deceased and “understandingly shrunk back from [defendants’] requests to
exhume and disfigure the deceased plaintiff’s body.” It noted that “many
dollars” were involved in the case.117 “[N]onetheless, we do not place cash
before conscience.”118 Despite the obvious “evidentiary value” of the body,
the “deceased’s family properly disposed of the body as would be expected in
the circumstances.” Notably, the court emphasized that the defendants had
waited until after burial and requested exhumation. The court hinted that a
similar request to obtain lung tissue prior to the funeral might have been
granted.119
not unique. In Jarrett v. State, 220 Md. App. 571, 104 A.3d 972 (2014), a criminal
defendant unsuccessfully requested a missing evidence instruction because the State
had permitted release and cremation of the skeletal remains of a murder victim, prior
to an independent medical examination of them. The court held that it was not error
to refuse to give the requested instruction. Defense counsel had argued that the State
destroyed important evidence, and the court noted that an adverse inference may be
drawn by the jury even in the absence of an instruction. Jarrett, 220 Md. App. at
580, 593, 104 A.3d at 977, 985 (“Indeed, despite the trial court’s decision not to give
a missing evidence instruction, the jury was still free to infer that the destroyed
evidence would have been detrimental to the State’s case.”). The defendant was
convicted of murdering his wife and, in a taped conversation with his son, the
defendant agreed to help pay for the cremation that he now complained was
prejudicial. Jarrett, 220 Md. App. at 579-80, 104 A.3d at 977. The court wrote that
“the State had no affirmative duty to preserve the remains after the autopsy was
completed.” Id. at 595, 104 A.3d at 986. The Jarrett court, like the Hollingsworth
court, stressed that human remains and “the emotional feelings of the living”
relatives were involved. Jarrett, 220 Md. App. 595, 104 A.3d at 986, n.5; cf.
Hollingsworth, 136 Md. App. at 137, 764 A.2d at 343.
113
Hollingsworth, 136 Md. App. at 137, 764 A.2d at 343.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 138, 764 A.2d at 343.
119
The court wrote:
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Cecil County Department of Social Services v. Russell, involved allegations
of sexual abuse of a minor for purposes of determining whether the alleged
abuser should be entered on the child abuse registry.120 During the abuse
investigation, an interview with the adult had been recorded.121 It was in the
possession of law enforcement, but not produced at the hearing.122 Instead,
the Department of Social Services (“DSS”) offered a sheriff’s report, based in
part on the recorded interview of the adult, without producing the tape itself.123
The circuit court remanded in order to have the audiotape made part of the
record. Affirming the remand, the court wrote in a footnote:
We have been advised that the disputed audio tape has been
destroyed. We do not know whether the destruction was
intentional to avoid disclosure in this case, or whether it was
done in the ordinary course of business. The better practice
would be to preserve all potential evidence until all
proceedings have been concluded.124
The court wrote that, if the audio recording was not produced on remand,
there would be a presumption that it was unfavorable to DSS.125 Because the

Appellants were certainly aware of the lethal nature of
mesothelioma, and could have taken the procedural steps
necessary, earlier in this action, in order to obtain or preserve the
evidence they desired without having to ask for exhumation of the
body. They elected not to go through discovery procedures to
request a biopsy or for the preservation of the lung tissue. We find
it unconscionable that they now denounce appellee’s next of kin
and counsel for ‘deliberate spoliation of evidence,’ simply because
they arranged for their loved one’s burial.
Hollingsworth, 136 Md. App. at 138, 764 A.2d at 343.
120
Cecil Co. Dept. of Soc. Services v. Russell, 159 Md. App. 594, 861 A.2d 92
(2004).
121
Id. at 599, 861 A.2d at 95.
122
Id. at 600, 861 A.2d at 96.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 617, 861 A.2d at 106.
125
The court explained:
As we read Miller and Anderson, we conclude that, upon remand,
the administrative law judge must make a factual determination
regarding the circumstances of destruction of the audio tape. An
intentional or willful destruction of the evidence could support a
presumption unfavorable to the DSS; however, the mere inability
to produce the audio tape would support an adverse inference
rather than a presumption.
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lawsuit turned on “little more than which of two persons is to be believed,” the
failure to produce the tape was prejudicial.126 Interestingly, the court
analogized to a criminal case: “Had Russell been charged with crimes as a
result of the investigation, the State’s Attorney would have been under a duty
to disclose the audio tape.”127
In Spengler v. Sears Roebuck & Co., a trial court’s decision not to instruct
on spoliation was affirmed.128 The holding was based on the requestor’s
failure to provide a factual predicate, and failure to show spoliation and
prejudice. Only some of the documents that had been requested in discovery
were produced; however, the jury had returned a verdict for the requestor.129
On those facts, there was no prejudice shown and the decision not to instruct
was affirmed.
In Keyes v. Hereman, a medical malpractice plaintiff sought a jury
instruction on spoliation.130 The defendant hospital’s rules and regulations
mandated preparation of a detailed operative report “as soon as possible.”131
There was, however, no such report in the plaintiff’s records, nor was there
any indication of one having been dictated. Plaintiff claimed that the lack of
a report hindered her experts.132 The circuit court declined to give an adverse
inference instruction; however, it permitted plaintiff’s counsel to argue
spoliation to the jury.133

Id. at 618-19, 861 A.2d at 106-07.
126
The court reasoned:
[T]he audio tape provides the most accurate, contemporaneous
record of Russell’s statements to the investigators. If the
investigators did not rely on the tape to make their reports, it
would have been the best source for the preparation of accurate
written reports. Likewise, fairness requires that Russell should
have the opportunity to use the recording to test the statements and
conclusions made by the investigators in their reports, and to test
their credibility and recall, if necessary. During the administrative
hearing, Russell’s counsel demonstrated instances where
discrepancies between his testimony and the investigators’
statements concerning the interview might easily have been
resolved.”
Cecil Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 159 Md. App. at 613, 861 A.2d at 103.
127
Id. at 613, 861 A.2d at 104.
128
Spengler v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 163 Md. App. 220, 878 A.2d 628 (2005).
129
Id. at 249, 878 A.2d at 645.
130
Keyes v. Hereman, 191 Md. App. 533, 992 A.2d 519 (2010).
131
Id. at 536, 992 A.2d at 521.
132
Id.
133
Id.; see also supra note 102.

2015]

The Duty to Preserve ESI & the Spoliation Doctrine

153

In Goin v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., the court held that the
spoliation doctrine was inapplicable where a store employee discarded a
perishable item that was on the floor at the time that a customer slipped and
fell.134 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had a legal duty to preserve the
relevant evidence and that “they cleaned the floor where [plaintiff] fell, while
she was still lying on the floor.”135 When the defendant moved for summary
judgment, the plaintiff argued that the motion should be denied because of an
adverse inference arising from spoliation. The circuit court granted summary
judgment and the decision was affirmed.136
In affirming the trial court’s decision, the appellate court wrote that “[t]here
may indeed be a ‘business premises slip and fall case’ in which the doctrine of
spoliation will prevent summary judgment in favor of the business,” however,
Goin was not that case. The court reasoned that there was “no evidence” that
the employee was instructed to “get rid of” such material or acted under a
policy to retain favorable, and discard unfavorable, evidence.137 It left “to
another day” whether there would be a different result if there was proof that
a defendant’s employee was instructed to keep favorable, and discard
unfavorable, evidence.138 The court wrote that, “[o]bviously, the preservation
of items which might be relevant evidence in litigation is desirable.”139
To similar effect, in another slip and fall case, Maans v. Giant of Maryland,
LLC, a customer sued a grocery store.140 The customer slipped and fell on
liquid on the floor. While on the floor, she heard the assistant store manager
tell someone who was holding a roll of paper towels “to get up all the water
off the floor.”141 As in any slip and fall case, plaintiff had to prove notice of
the unsafe condition. The store did not keep records of when the area was
inspected, and plaintiff contended that the store’s failure to maintain records
made it impossible to prove a negligence case.142 The court rejected that
argument: “Under Maryland law, the owner/operator of a store has no duty to
an invitee to keep records in order to lighten the invitee’s burden of proving
negligence.”143
In accord with the court of appeals, in Dobkin the court of special appeals
has, in dicta, cited out-of-state authority for the proposition that “spoliation by
134

Goin v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., 166 Md. App. 611, 890 A.2d 894
(2006).
135
Id. at 615, 890 A.2d at 896.
136
Id. at 616, 890 A.2d at 897.
137
Id.
138
Id. at n.2.
139
Id. at 618, 890 A.2d at 898
140
Maans v. Giant of Maryland, LLC, 161 Md. App. 620, 871 A.2d 627 (2005), cert
denied, 388 Md. 98, 879 A.2d 39 (2005).
141
Id. at 624, 871 A.2d at 629.
142
Id. at 625, 871 A.2d at 630.
143
Id. at 635, 871 A.2d at 636. It does not appear that plaintiff argued that the postinjury clean-up of the water was spoliation.
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itself did not create a triable issue.”144 Similarly, in Meyer v. McDonnell, the
intermediate appellate court emphasized that, under Maszczenski and Romeo,
the inference did not substitute for proof of a fact necessary to the party’s
case.145
In Shpak v. Schertle, however, a witness was permitted to testify that she
had been threatened if she testified.146 The court held that the testimony was
admissible, writing that “testimony of spoliation is, in and of itself, substantive
evidence in support of the other party’s claim.”147 It also approved a jury
instruction on spoliation: “If you find that a party tried to intimidate or to
influence witnesses, you may consider the conduct as an indication of
consciousness by that party that his or her case is weak or unfounded.”148

144

Dobkin v. Univ. of Balt. School of Law, 210 Md. App. 580, 608, 63 A.3d 692,
708-09 (2013) (citing Reeves v. Transp., Inc., 111 Cal. Rept. 3d 896, 909 (2010)).
145
Meyer v. McDonnell, 40 Md. App. 524, 529-31, 392 A.2d 1129, 1132-33 (1978).
146
Shpak v. Schertle, 97 Md. App. 207, 629 A.2d 763 (1993), cert. denied, 333 Md.
201, 634 A.2d 62 (1993).
147
Id. at 224, 629 A.2d at 772.
148
The court wrote: “We conclude that the court properly instructed the jury on
spoliation. The instruction, under Meyer, was an accurate statement of the applicable
law and was generated by the evidence.” Id. at 227-28, 629 A.2d at 774 (internal
citations omitted). In another tampering case, the court wrote:
[T]he conduct of appellee in attempting to intimidate Doctors
Nystrom and Pizzi is admissible as tending to show his
consciousness of the weakness of his case and a belief that his
defense would not prevail without the aid of such improper and
unfair tactics as those in which he engaged. This, in conjunction
with the other evidence in the case, may lead to the further
inference that appellee considers his case to be weak because he,
in fact, is guilty of the negligence which appellant asserts he
committed. Such inferences are, of course, merely permissible and
the jury is free to either accept or reject them as it sees fit. . . .
[O]ur holding is that the evidence in question had probative value
insofar as it related to the appellee’s consciousness of the
weakness of his case and it could have been considered by the jury
for that purpose. There was evidence that the operation caused the
appellant’s complaints. There was also evidence that the
appellant’s complaints were not true and that in any event they
were not caused by the operation. We cannot say that the evidence
of the doctor’s misconduct in attempting to influence witnesses for
the opposition would not have turned the scales of justice in the
jury’s mind if they had been properly instructed on the question.
We therefore reverse.
Meyer, 40 Md. App. at 533-34, 392 A.2d at 1134.
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VIII. THE SPOLIATION DOCTRINE IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF MARYLAND
While there is no comprehensive source of circuit court ESI spoliation
opinions, a number of them are available.149 Circuit courts have held that an
adverse inference may, or may not, defeat summary judgment based on the
unique facts of the case.
In a recent ESI decision involving text messages and mobile devices, any
inference raised by spoliation was insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment for misappropriation of trade secrets. In Maryland Orthotics &
Prosthetics Co., Inc. v. Metro Prosthetics, Inc.,150 as part of its response to a
summary judgment motion, the plaintiff asserted spoliation based on deletion
of text messages and attempting to wipe devices by resetting them, arguing
“that Defendants Haun and Goller destroyed electronic information that
provided evidence of their competitive activities.”151 In response, the
defendants offered evidence that the destruction was not intentional and,
instead, the data was auto-deleted.152 The court suggested that the deletion and
resets “may have innocent meanings . . . .” The court found that there was a
genuine dispute of material fact regarding this allegation; however, because
the information at issue was not a trade secret, the court held that even if an
adverse inference was drawn, it would not prevent summary judgment on the
trade secret claim.153
On the other hand, a spoliation issue was one factor that precluded summary
judgment in Estate of Delores Ethel Stray v. Kinali.154 State Farm’s motion
for summary judgment, asserting that a driver was not negligent in a fatal
encounter with a pedestrian, presented issues of negligence and contributory
negligence. The driver had left the scene and “tried to dispose of parts of the

149

Unfortunately, and due to the understandable demand on the resources of the
circuit courts, many of the available decisions are conclusory. See, e.g., Wynn v. MJ
Harbor Hotel, No. N 24-C-08-001376 OT, 2010 WL 4567746 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt.
City Feb. 1, 2010); Jarvis v. Geico Ins. Co., 295923-V, 2009 WL 6652820 (Md. Cir.
Ct. Montgomery Cnty. July 23, 2009); Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex, Inc., 223043-V,
2004 WL 5752514 (Md. Cir. Ct. Montgomery Cnty. Aug. 26, 2004); Stanton v.
Legal Sea Foods, Inc., No. 24-C-03-005914, 2004 WL 5248867 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt.
City April 12, 2004); Shockley v. Chesser, 24-C-01-001037, 2002 WL 34227132
(Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City Oct. 28, 2002).
150
No. 03-C-12-1648, 2013 WL 8813708 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. Cnty., June 6, 2013)
(Finifter, J.).
151
Id. at *22.
152
The court did not discuss whether the duty to preserve had been triggered. Nor
did it analyze whether the auto-deletion was protected under the “safe harbor”
provision of Maryland Rule 2-433(b). Id.
153
Id. at *22.
154
No. 10-9274, 2011 WL 7986596 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. Cnty. Sept. 12, 2011) (Fader,
J.).
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vehicle that hit the Decedent. . . .”155 The “possible admission of spoliation
evidence,” in combination with other facts, defeated summary judgment.156
Circuit courts have been clear in requiring that a party seeking spoliation
sanctions bears the burden of proving that the information that had to be
preserved in fact existed.157 In Solesky v. Tracy, the “pit bull” case that reached
the Court of Appeals of Maryland,158 the circuit court denied a spoliation
motion against the landlord: “What the movant attempts to do is to equate the
absence of records held by the landlord, and the absence of correspondence,
etc. with a failure to preserve which the movant sees as equating to any intent
to destroy evidence.”159 The court ruled that “[t]his is not a permissible
inference under the circumstances” presented by an ill, eighty-nine year-old
landlord.160 The court wrote:
[T]here is simply no evidence that the Landlord kept prior
leases which were thrown away or pictures or anything else
which were discarded in connection with this law case or the
incident of the [pit bull] attack. Spoliation evidence has to
have a nexus which is not evident from the information
presented by the movant in support of the motion.161
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion.162 It noted that the landlord’s counsel “explained that,
155

Id.
Id.
157
For a decision discussing the role of presumptions in the context of spoliated ESI,
see infra note 175.
158
Tracey v. Solesky, 427 Md. 627, 635-36, 50 A.3d 1075, 1079 (2012), as amended
on reconsideration, (Aug. 21, 2012).
159
Solesky v. Tracey, No. 8-3489, 2009 WL 8606518 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. Cnty. May
29, 2009) (Fader, J.).
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
The intermediate appellate court wrote:
156

The threshold inquiry is whether there was ‘[a]n act of destruction’
of discoverable evidence on the part of the accused party. By
necessity, this inquiry begins after the movant shows that the
evidence actually existed in the first place. Here, however, the
circuit court noted that there was no evidence that relevant
documents or pictures existed. Because the court was not clearly
erroneous in finding that the Soleskys’ motion did not support a
conclusion that unproduced documents having material relevance
to this case had ever been in existence, the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to sanction Tracey for allegedly
destroying evidence.
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if there ever were any further documents, they had been lost.” The landlord
had moved into her mother’s home and “the movers had lost many of her
mother’s things during the move, including her leasing files.”163 Additionally,
a digital camera broke and was thrown away. While the Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari on the spoliation issue, it did not reach it.164
To the same effect, in Davies v. Salisbury State University,165 a university
did not make a tape or transcript of a hearing, asserting that its due process
rules prohibited it from doing so. Plaintiff asserted that the “failure to make a
record of the proceeding should be comparable in effect to spoliation of
evidence by the University, i.e. failure to create this evidence should be
likened to destruction of such evidence if it had existed.”166 The court noted
that plaintiff cited no authority, and rejected the argument.167
Digital recording systems were involved in Ghee v. The Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Company.168 Plaintiff contended that the defendant should be
barred from offering evidence on what would have been shown by missing
digital recordings, apparently asserting that the lack of the recordings was
evidence of spoliation. The defendant asserted that it recycled recorded video
after six months.169 It proved that between the time plaintiff was discharged
and the time plaintiff sued, the recording was erased. The court held: “The
automatic re-recording on the medium would not appear to rise to the level to
bar testimonial evidence of what occurred by those who participated,
irrespective of what the recording may have shown. Plaintiffs motion is
therefore denied.”170
In Corporate Healthcare Financing, Inc. v. Breedlove, there was an
allegation that an employee had improperly emailed company data to the

Solesky v. Tracey, 198 Md. App. 292, 309, 17 A.3d 718, 728 (2011) (holding that a
circuit court judge has great discretion in deciding whether to impose sanctions),
aff’d on other grounds, 427 Md. 627, 50 A.3d 1075 (2012). Solesky was
legislatively modified on an issue unrelated to ESI or this article. Md. Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Art. §3-1901 Code Ann.
163
Solesky, 198 Md. App. at 301-02, 17 A.3d at 724.
164
Tracey v. Solesky, 427 Md. 627, 635, 50 A.3d 1075, 1079 (2012).
165
No. C00-0592, 2002 WL 34148047 (Md. Cir. Ct. Wicomico Cnty. May 31, 2002)
(Davis, J.).
166
Id.
167
Id. (holding that some record of the hearing was required).
168
No. 24-C-09-001313, 2010 WL 2128987 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City Apr. 1, 2010).
169
Id.
170
Id. The opinion in Ghee does not provide sufficient information to ascertain
when the duty to preserve was triggered. Once triggered, the continuation of a
policy of overwriting data might become indefensible. See Md. Rule 2-433(b)
(protecting only routine, good faith destruction). If litigation was reasonably
anticipated by the defendant prior to the commencement of the lawsuit, the holding
may be questioned.
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employee’s personal email account.171 The court authorized early, albeit
limited, discovery because “identifying and segregating the data at issue early
will prevent any spoliation or corruption of evidence, even of an unintentional
nature, that may occur through simple continual usage of the home
computer.”172
IX. SUGGESTION FOR A THREE-STEP ANALYSIS
A number of Maryland courts have followed the 1997 federal decision in
White v. Office of Public Defender for the State of Md., when applying the
spoliation doctrine.173 Under White as applied in the Maryland courts, there
are four elements for spoliation: (1) an act of destruction; (2) discoverability
of the evidence; (3) an intent to destroy the evidence; and, (4) occurrence of
the act at a time after suit has been filed, or, if before, at a time when the filing
is fairly perceived as imminent.174
The cited application of White suggests that there must be an intent to
destroy evidence. However, the jury instruction quoted in Cost—and other
Maryland decisions such as Miller and Anderson—support spoliation
sanctions for negligent or unintentional destruction of information, the loss of
which is prejudicial.175
171

Corporate Healthcare Financing, Inc. v. Breedlove, No. 13-C-06-650047, 2006
WL 2400073 (Md. Cir. Ct. Howard Cnty. April 19, 2006) (Sweeney, J.).
172
Id. at *3.
173
Referring to White, the Klupt court wrote that the circuit court “wisely followed a
recent decision of the U.S. District Court for Maryland, which clearly laid out the
consensus rules for sanctioning destruction of evidence.” Klupt v. Krongard, 126
Md. App. 179, 199, 728 A.2d 727, 737 (1999) (citing White v Office Pub. Defender,
170 F.R.D. 138, 147-48 (D. Md. 1997)); accord Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v.
Connor, 136 Md. App. 91, 137, 764 A.2d 318, 343 (2000); Weaver v. ZeniMax
Media, Inc., 175 Md. App. 16, 43, 923 A.2d 1032, 1048 (2007); see Homes v.
Hazlewood, 210 Md. App. 615, 669, 63 A.3d 713, 746 (2013), cert. denied, 432 Md.
468 (2013) (citing White, 170 F.R.D. 138).
174
Klupt, 126 Md. App. at 199, 728 A.2d at 737. After citing those elements, the
White court wrote:
[A] fifth element is in a sense always required, namely prejudice to the
opposing party, since sanctions are not as a rule imposed where there has
been no prejudice to a party. But since the extent of the prejudice bears
more on the issue of the scope of the sanction to be imposed rather than the
issue of whether any sanction should be imposed at all, discussion of that
element may be deferred until the scope issue is addressed.
White, 170 F.R.D. at 147.
175
“Prejudice” has been given a narrow definition in this context: “Spoliation of
evidence causes prejudice when, as a result of the spoliation, the party claiming
spoliation cannot present ‘evidence essential to its underlying claim’.” Victor
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A persuasive body of recent case law suggests that spoliation decisions
should be made using what is essentially a three-step analysis. First, was there
a duty to preserve potentially responsive information? That question turns on
(a) whether the duty was triggered, and, if so, (b) an analysis of its scope, and
(c) proportionality limits to the scope. Second, if there was a breach of the
duty, was it accompanied by a sufficiently culpable state of mind? Finally,
was the loss prejudicial to the innocent party and, if so, what sanction is
appropriate?176
Two goals of the spoliation doctrine should be to level the playing field and
deter misconduct. For example, in Cost, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
suggested that the overriding goal in assessing a spoliation issue should be to
level the playing field when there is a prejudicial failure to preserve potentially
responsive information.177 In Hoffman, the court of appeals condemned
destruction in violation of a regulatory and ethical duty to preserve that
information, i.e., deterrence.178 Similarly, the wrongdoer in Klupt purposely
and deceptively destroyed tapes well after a duty to preserve them had arisen—
misconduct that needed to be deterred.179
The result in Goin, the grocery store slip-and-fall case, might be different
under this three-step framework.180 Instead of looking at what instructions
were, or were not, given to the employee who destroyed the material that led
to the slip-and-fall, a court might ask if the duty to preserve was triggered by
the fall, i.e., whether, under an objective standard, litigation was reasonably
anticipated at the time that the plaintiff was lying injured on the floor.181 If the

Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 532 (D. Md. 2010) (citation
omitted). The Victor Stanley decision discusses the presumptions applicable to a
determination of prejudice that flow from intentional, as opposed to negligent, acts.
Id.
176
Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 509 (D. Md. 2009); Victor
Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 520; First Mariner Bank v. Resolution Law Grp., P.C., CIV.
MJG-12-1133, 2014 WL 1652550 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2014); cf. Harrell v. Pathmark,
2015 WL 803076, *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2015) (holding no sanctions in slip-and-fall
case occurring in grocery store where the scene was photographed and video footage
not preserved), appeal filed, __ F.3d __ (3d Circ. 2015). See generally L. WHARTON
& S. WEIRICK, “DUTY TO PRESERVE: BEST PRACTICES, SPOLIATION, SANCTIONS, AND
THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION,” in MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 1.
MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE:
SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION,
ch. 1 (Daniel F. Gourash ed., ABA 3d ed. 2013).
177
Cost v. State, 417 Md. 360, 10 A.3d 184 (2010).
178
Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 867 A.2d 276 (2005).
179
Klupt v. Krongard, 115 Md. App. 549, 694 A.2d 150 (1997).
180
See Goin v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., 166 Md. App. 611, 890 A.2d 894
(2006).
181
One court suggested, “Even in a highly litigious community or culture, just
because a person falls in a grocery store does not mean that litigation is imminent.”
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duty was triggered, the next question might have been to define its scope, i.e.,
was the destroyed material relevant? Then, the court could consider
proportionality, i.e., the cost of preserving it. If the duty was breached, the
next question would be whether the destruction was with a culpable state of
mind and, under Maryland case law, even unintentional destruction may
support some sanctions. Finally, a reviewing court would determine whether
plaintiff had been prejudiced by the destruction. In short, was there a need to
level the playing field?
Similarly, a different analysis might have led to a different result in
Maszczenksi v. Myers.182 There, a five-year-old, pupil fell when a swing at a
private kindergarten broke. A short time before the event, some links in the
chain had been replaced. The defendant testified that the spreader link “had
no apparent defect and had nothing wrong with it . . . .”183 After the fall,
however, defendant found, but threw away, the broken link “because he had
no reason to keep it.”184 Plaintiff’s expert testified regarding spreader links,
but “[h]e had, of course, never inspected the link in question here, and, of
course, did not know[] whether it did in fact reopen.”185 Plaintiff complained
that it lacked the evidence because the defendant had destroyed it. As noted
above, the court wrote that there was no evidence that defendant “disposed of
the link intentionally for the purpose of concealing the fact that it opened,” and
“[i]t could hardly be contended” that disposal of the link was sufficient to show
that a pre-accident inspection would have revealed a defect.186
Under the three-step approach applied to the same facts, the first question
would be whether litigation was reasonably anticipated when the swing broke
and the child was injured, not whether the defendant had a reason to keep the
broken link. Assuming that litigation was reasonably anticipated, the duty to
preserve would be triggered, and the second question would be whether that
duty was breached by throwing away the broken link. Clearly the link was
relevant, and the cost of retaining it would not be disproportionate to the case.
Those factors could support a conclusion of breach. If a breach was found,
the next inquiry would be whether the breach was accompanied by a culpable
state of mind. While the court determined that there was no evidence of
disposal with intent to conceal a fact,187 as noted above, many Maryland cases
support spoliation sanctions for unintentional acts. Finally, the question would
be whether the plaintiff was prejudiced because she could not produce
evidence due to the defendant’s destruction of the link. That appears to have

Harrell v. Pathmark, 2015 WL 803076, *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2015), appeal filed, __
F.3d __ (3d Cir. 2015).
182
212 Md. 346, 129 A.2d 109 (1957).
183
Id. at 349, 129 A.2d at 110-11.
184
Id. at 350, 129 A.2d at 111.
185
Id. at 351, 129 A.2d at 111.
186
Id. at 355, 129 A.2d at 114.
187
Id.
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been the case in light of the expert’s inability to examine the spreader link.
Thus, application of the three-step analysis may have led to a different result
in Maszczenksi v. Myers.188
X. CONCLUSION AND CAUTIONARY NOTE
There are good reasons to approach sanctions decisions with great
caution.189 They often arise in an unclear context: “Courts, lawyers, and
litigants are, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, still . . . ‘writing the
book’ on the use of electronic information in litigation.”190 Nevertheless, a
few years ago, the Duke Law Journal reported that sanctions were at an “alltime high.”191 In this evolving context, sanctions may negatively impact
civility and have the potential to unfairly destroy careers.
First, sanctions provide a civil law analog to the criminal Brady192 attack.
They permit civil litigators to prevail, not on the merits, but by attacking
opposing counsel. The potential impact on civility is obvious.193
188

A different result might also have been reached in Maryland Jockey Club of
Baltimore City, Inc. v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., No. 2364, 2002 WL 32123994
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Dec 17, 2002). There, a defective electrical transformer
malfunctioned during the Preakness. The owner and its insurer sued BG&E, which
had removed and not preserved the parts that had malfunctioned. In pertinent part,
the court construed the pleading to assert a separate tort of spoliation and correctly
rejected that assertion.
189
In the context of Maryland Rule 1-341, sanctions are an “extraordinary remedy”
that are reserved “for the rare and exceptional case.” Art Form Interiors, Inc. v.
Columbia Homes, Inc., 92 Md. App. 587, 594-95, 609 A.2d 370, 374 (1992).
“[J]udicial hindsight” is not permitted. Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. v. Bishop’s Garth
Associates Ltd. P’ship, 75 Md. App. 214, 222, 540 A.2d 1175, 1179 (1988)
(referring to “judicially guided missiles”); see also Andrew J. Felser, Guiding the
Guided Missile, The Baltimore Barrister, Fall 1988, at 19 (“One court has called
these sanctions judicially guided missiles pointed at those who proceed in the courts
without any colorable right to do so.”).
190
MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 1, at 748.
191
Dan H. Willoughby et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By The
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 790 (2010) (“E-discovery sanctions are at an all time
high.”). The Willoughby article states that “there has been a significant increase in
both motions and awards since 2004.” Id. at 790-91. While “[m]arquee e-discovery
disaster cases . . . are towering reminders of the most severe sanctions . . . [o]f
greater concern to the average practitioner is the increasing frequency of sanction
decisions.” Id. at 792-93.
192
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
193
In an earlier blog, the author explained:
Sanctions motions in civil cases have developed a civil procedure
analog to a Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)] attack on
alleged prosecutorial misconduct. In short, under the sanctions
rules, civil litigators could obtain a tactical advantage by alleging
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Second, there is a substantial risk of error, and the impact can be irreparable.
Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., is illustrative.194 In 2008, a United States
Magistrate Judge “properly incensed” at counsel’s conduct, imposed $8.5
million in sanctions and referred six attorneys to California Bar Counsel for
possible disciplinary action.195 That decision received wide publicity. On
review, however, the District Judge ruled that the Magistrate Judge had
erroneously analyzed privilege issues, prejudicing the lawyers, and vacated
the sanctions decision.
A fifteen-month period of discovery followed.196 Seven engineers, four
attorneys and two paralegals were deposed. Following a three-day hearing,
the court determined that the attorneys, although they acted in bad faith, should
not be sanctioned. While the court remained critical of the previouslysanctioned attorneys, the court also described “an incredible lack of candor”
by their former client in its discussions with them.197
By the time the sanctions were lifted, however, the attorneys’ careers and
personal lives had been devastated.198 Several left their law firm “and never
landed a job with a new firm.”199 Qualcomm’s general counsel reportedly
resigned shortly after the initial decision.200 While no one is asserting that the
attorneys were error-free, the collateral impact of an erroneous imposition of
sanctions appears disproportionate to the flaws identified under the
circumstances presented.201
deficiencies in the performance of opposing counsel. The
opposing attorney, countering such allegations, was often tempted
to respond in kind. Civility suffered.
Michael D. Berman, What Does ‘The Making of a Surgeon’ Have to Do With ESI
and ‘Software Glitches’, (July 15, 2011), http://www.esi-mediation.com/what-does%e2%80%9cthe-making-of-a-surgeon%e2%80%9d-have-to-do-with-esi-andsoftware-glitches/ (quotations omitted); see also Susan Souder & Karen M. Crabtree,
Sanctions in Litigation, 23 MD. BAR J. 29 (1990) (noting that sanctions requests are
examples of the erosion of courtesy and respect among attorneys); Albert D. Brault,
Maryland’s Controversial Law of Sanctions, 26 MD. BAR J. 19 (1993) (stating that
the rule “has turned out to be an additional weapon in litigation”).
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2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan.7, 2008), vacated and remanded in part, 2008 WL
638108 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008), reconsideration denied, 2008 WL 2705161 (S.D.
Cal. Jul. 7, 2008), appeal dismissed, 327 Fed. Appx. 877, 2008 WL 1336937 (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 18, 2008), on remand, 2010 WL 1336937 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2010).
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MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 1, at 707.
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Id. at 719.
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Id. at 720 n.82.
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Id. (quoting Z. Elinson, Lawyers in Discovery Scandal Say Qualcomm Lied,
Recorder (Nov. 3, 2009)).
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For an older discussion of cases in which sanctions orders were reversed in
Maryland, see Brault, supra note 193, at 24-26.
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It is suggested that the formula described in cases such as Victor Stanley
and Praxair202 is a more modern and satisfactory description of when a breach
of the duty to preserve supports spoliation sanctions.

202

See Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 509 (D. Md. 2009);
Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 520 (D. Md. 2010); First
Mariner Bank v. Resolution Law Grp., P.C., CIV. MJG-12-1133, 2014 WL 1652550
(D. Md. Apr. 22, 2014). See generally WHARTON & WEIRICK, supra note 176.

